We provide a general framework for characterizing the trade-off between accuracy and robustness in supervised learning. We propose a method and define quantities to characterize the trade-off between accuracy and robustness for a given architecture, and provide theoretical insight into the trade-off. Specifically we introduce a simple trade-off curve, define and study an influence function that captures the sensitivity, under adversarial attack, of the optima of a given loss function. We further show how adversarial training regularizes the parameters in an over-parameterized linear model, recovering the LASSO and ridge regression as special cases, which also allows us to theoretically analyze the behavior of the trade-off curve. In experiments, we demonstrate the corresponding trade-off curves of neural networks and how they vary with respect to factors such as number of layers, neurons, and across different network structures. Such information provides a useful guideline to architecture selection.
Introduction
Designing effective defense mechanisms against adversarial examples is vital for machine learning [2, 4, 11, 6, 20] . Most state-of-the-art defense mechanisms are based on choosing suitable parameters for a given architecture in order to achieve a balance between accuracy and robustness [12, 18] (we use the word "architecture" to describe a model architecture such as linear regression or a convolutional neural network). Empirical studies have shown that there may exist an inherent tension between adversarial robustness and native accuracy [21] . However, we still yet to understand how to characterize the trade-off between robustness and accuracy for a given architecture and the underlying theories behind it. Our paper attempts to uncover those theories.
Characterizing the Trade-off
Why is it important to characterize the inherent trade-off of an architecture? That is because there are many mysteries unknown: for example, is accuracy always at the cost of robustness? How is the trade-off related to the number of neurons and layers? Besides, such characterization may serve as a potential guide for architecture selection. Recent works show that neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial examples, even though the perturbations to data are imperceptible to human eyes [3, 8, 13, 14] . Researchers have developed many defense mechanisms [23, 15] . Among them, several mechanisms involve choosing suitable parameters for a given neural network architecture, sacrificing a certain degree of accuracy in order to be more robust. For example, instead of choosing θ * := arg min θ∈Θ E P0 [l(θ, x, y)] (notice that l depends on what architecture being used), where l is a loss function and P 0 is a distribution on the space X × Y, [12] where S is a ε-ball in l p -norm.
In [19] , it claims that architecture is a more important factor than size concerning robustness. It is natural to question: what is the role of architecture with respect to the trade-off between accuracy and robustness? With different θ's, the accuracy and robustness differs -promoting the robustness may decrease the accuracy. However, that trade-off is not so severe under some architectures. [16] shows some architectures such as variational autoencoder can yield a robust model even using the parameter chosen by ordinary optimization, which can be very accurate while still be relatively robust. Thus, a general guideline seems to be very useful -a pre-screening procedure to tell a researcher which architectures may be more promising to start with.
Thus, we use Trade-off Curve (TOC) to characterize the trade-off of an architecture by looking into the smallest native loss it can achieve, the smallest adversarial loss it can achieve and the trade-off between accuracy and robustness along the change of parameters.
Understanding the Trade-off
We attempt to understand the trade-off separately in two regimes -whether ε is infinitesimal or not.
For infinitesimal ε, we use the influence function, an efficient tool from robust statistics. We adopt its spirit and develop an influence function of adversarial attack (IFA) in order to capture how the parameters change as the input data are adversarially perturbed. It can further give us insight about what factors affect the sensitivity of parameters with respect to adversarial attack. Using the IFA, we can obtain a closed form approximation to the trade-off quantity we define later.
When ε is not infinitesimal, we illustrate how over-parameterization affects the trade-off. We show that already in a simple natural data model, over-parameterization can cause the gap between accuracy and robustness no matter how small the perturbation is. We further explore how adversarial training imposes regularization to the loss function and how adversarial training is related to classic statistical model selection. By understanding the adversarial training, it is beneficial to theoretically characterize the trade-off curve.
Related Work
There has been some other work on exploring the trade-off between accuracy and robustness, which bring us great insights. [21] provides the insight that accuracy may be at odds with robustness by experiments and use a simple example as a proof of concept to analyze theoretically. In [19] , the authors thoroughly benchmark 18 ImageNet models using multiple robustness metrics. They mainly focus on experimentally studying the trade-off. A closely related work by Zhang et al. [24] identify a trade-off between robustness and accuracy, but their aim is mainly to use the trade-off to guide principle in the design of defenses against adversarial examples for a fixed architecture while the trade-off we identify is mainly for characterizing different architectures.
How to Characterize the Trade-off
Consider the supervised learning problem from some input space X (e.g., images) to an output space Y (e.g.,labels). Let P 0 denote the underlying distribution of (x, y) ∈ X × Y. We also assume we are given a suitable loss function l(θ, x, y; A), for example, the cross-entropy loss for a neural network, where θ is the parameter, and we specify the architecture A by explicitly writing it out in the loss function expression.
For fixed θ, we use the expected loss on clean data at θ to quantify accuracy, and use the expected adversarial loss to quantify robustness. We do not directly use accuracy here since the loss is usually negative correlated to accuracy, and easier to analyze theoretically. Specifically, we denote
where we adopt the most commonly used formulation of S -an ε ball in l p norm for 1 ≤ p ≤ ∞. Then, for each θ, we can quantify accuracy and robustness by α(θ) and β(θ) respectively. In order to characterize the trade-off of an architecture, the ideal way is to examine (α(θ), β(θ)) for every possible θ, which is impossible to implement. A better way is to examine the Pareto frontier since we actually only care about those parameters which are not sub-optimal. Here "sub-optimal" means we can obtain the same performance under adversarial attack while having better performance on clean data.
Trade-off Curve: We start by choosing the two end points for the trade-off curve. We denote θ * as one of the minimizers of α(θ) that has the lowest value of adversarial loss. Similarly, we denote θ * ε as one of the minimizers of β(θ) that has the lowest value of native loss. We build a Cartesian coordinate system whose horizontal axis represents the expected native loss and vertical axis represents the expected loss under adversarial attack. Then, we denote the point (α(θ * ), β(θ * )) as P 1 and (α(θ * ε ), β(θ * ε )) as P 2 . For each θ, its coordinates are (α(θ), β(θ)) and by the nature of θ * and θ * ε , α(θ) ≥ α(θ * ) and β(θ) ≥ β(θ * ε ) for all θ ∈ Θ. The Pareto frontier is defined as the boundary where each point (α(θ b ), β(θ b )) lying on it has the property: for any θ ∈ Θ,
as figure 1 states. The inherent goodness of an architecture is fully characterized by the efficient Figure 1 : Illustration of The Pareto Frontier frontier, since this curve is the collection of "good" points. Any point (α(θ), β(θ)) has corresponding points on the frontier which perform no worse than it in both accuracy and robustness. The methodology above require us to do the following optimization:
In implementation, we sample the points on the curve and then link them. Thus, we only need solve the following class of optimizations:
for ξ ∈ (0, 1) since it can be proven that for all ξ ∈ (0, 1), the solution to the optimization in (1) lies on the trade-off curve. However, we should be more careful when dealing with the endpoints, since (α(θ), β(θ)) obtained by simply optimizing β(θ) and α(θ) may not lie on the frontier. Thus, we choose to optimize (1) with ξ very close to 0 and 1 to approximate both end points of the trade-off curve. To sum up, we can simply change ξ and link the obtained points to get an approximation to our trade-off curve.
In order to further investigate the trade-off of a given architecture theoretically, we take the two endpoints θ * ε and θ * , and we further identify the trade-off using the following quantity:
If this quantity is small, we would expect the architecture does not suffer a great trade-off under adversarial attack.
With smoothness and compactness conditions, we can obtain
Thus, understanding the behavior of θ * ε − θ * is key to understanding the trade-off. Such a characterization is given in the following section.
where
, y e i ; A) denotes the hessian matrix of loss on evaluation data set (X e , Y e ) := ({x
).
Influence Function of Adversarial Attack
We want to theoretically understand what is the effect on optimal loss function when our input data are adversarially perturbed a little bit. In order to do that, as we mentioned above, understandinĝ θ ε −θ is the key since we can see from the expression of∆(A) ,θ ε −θ is an important component. In the spirit of the influence function, we use the following concept,which we call the influence function of adversarial attack (IFA), to capture the idea of studying models through their training data. Notice that our concept is different from the one proposed by [1] called adversarial influence function (AIF), since in their setting the adversary is trying to maliciously interfere with parameter estimation while in our setting the adversary is trying to interfere with prediction power. For simplicity, we omit the supscript for X and Y here, and only use X, Y to illustrate our point.
We define
For given X and Y , we can also view
as g(θ, P ), where
We can obtain: Theorem 1. If X , Y and Θ are compact,α is three times continuously differentiable on Θ × X , the Hessian matrix Hθ(X, Y ) is positive definite, and g(·, P ) is differentiable for every P and ∇ θ g(θ, P ) andθ lies in the interior of Θ, with non-zero ∇ xα (θ, X, Y ), then we have
T , where
Here, we have
T . d is the dimension of θ and m is the dimension of x k .
This theorem can be used as a theoretical tool to understand how sensitive the optima of loss function is under adversarial attack and we can use ε·IFA to approximateθ ε −θ. Notice that as long as the unique global minimum θ * is well-separated, by continuity, if the sample size is large enough, the Hessian Hθ is positive definite. Besides, the theorem can be extended beyond the case ∇ xα (θ, X, Y ) = 0. In those cases, we need to derive higher order influence function. We leave it to future work. Example 1 (Shallow Neural Network). Consider the architecture studied in [5] , which has the following form:
, where a j 's are constant scalars and w j is a vector with the same dimension of x, both are m. W is the weight matrix whose j-th column is w j . σ is the quadaratic activation function σ(z) = z 2 . The loss function is taken as
where · F is the Frobenius norm and µ > 0.
T and we can obtain IFA accordingly:
More detailed expression is attached in the supplementary material.
Recall when ε is small, the trade-off we defined yieldŝ
where we further by approximate (θ ε −θ) by −H 
As data size increases, we would expect λ t min /λ e min and λ t max /λ e max goes to 1. We can see the trade-off is closely related to the spectrum of Hessian matrix and Φ and enjoys a quadratic form.
More General Cases
If by running SGD onα, we obtainθ, it is possible thatθ is neither a global minimum, nor a unique global minimum. If we hope to theoretically analyze the sensitivity of the optimal loss function under adversarial attack atθ, we can do as [9] to study a surrogate loss. Specifically, we form a convex quadratic approximation of the loss aroundθ, i.e.,α(θ, X, Y ; A) :=α(θ, X, Y ; A) + ∇ θα (θ, X, Y ; A)
Here µ is a damping term to make Hθ is positive definite, which corresponds to adding L 2 regularization on θ.
To sum up, in subection 3.1, we study the sensitivity of minimizer of loss function under adversarial attack, where the attack size is infinitesimal. Besides, we assume there are enough data. The cases of larger attack size and over-parameterization are hard to analyze, thus, we choose to study linear model to shed some light on adversarial training in subsection 3.2.
Regularization by Adversarial Training in Over-Parameterized Case
It has been believed the adversarial training helps regularize the model. We dedicate this paragraph to theoretically illustrate the regularization imposed by adversarial training in over-parametrized linear model, which can help us character the corresponding trade-off curve. For simplicity, we consider the over-parametrized linear model, where the data generating process follows Y = Xθ * , where d > n. Here
. . .
y i is a scalar, and x i and θ * are both vectors of dimension d.
We consider the loss Y − Xθ 2 2 . In this case, it is easy to see the generalization error can be very large if we just do the simplest standard training. That is because if we minimize Y t − X t θ 2 2 , since d > n, it is possible that the design matrix X t has multiple sub-matrices with rank n, so that there are infinite number of minimizers. Example 2. Let the design matrix be a Bernoulli matrix, with i.i.d. entries with probability 0.5 equals 1, and 0.5 equals −1. Let d > n. With high probability, there exists infinitely many of minimizers, and for any B > 0, there exists a minimizerθ B such that the loss on evaluation data
However, if we do adversarial training, it can regularize the model. We firstly study the l ∞ -bounded case, where we require δ i ∞ ≤ ε. We denote the set of n × d matrices, in which the infinity norm of each row is bounded by ε as Ξ. Then, given a data set (X, Y ), the adversarial training can be written as the following optimization:
Theorem 2. Assume Y = Xθ * , the optimization in (2) is equivalent to the following optimization:
for some b such that 0 ≤ b ≤ ε θ * 1 , which is equivalent to LASSO: min θ∈Θ
Under some regularity conditions, LASSO can have really good behavior, which can help us see the power of adversarial training. Specifically, we assume:
where S is the support of θ * , C ζ (S) := {∆ ∈ R p | ∆ S c 1 ≤ ζ ∆ S 1 } and ∆ S is a vector has the same entries with ∆ on S and 0 elsewhere. Regularity condition (3) is very commonly seen in over-parameterized models, which requires the true parameters actually sit on a low-dimensional manifold. For (4), some commonly seen random matrices can satisfy it with high probabilty. For example, the random matrix with i.i.d. N (0, 1) entries which satisfies restricted isometry property is one way to certify the restricted eigenvalue properties with high probability. Corollary 1. If we further assume (3) and (4) with ζ ≥ 1, ifθ ε is a minimizer of (2), we can obtain
From (5), we can see, unlike directly minimize Y − Xθ 2 2 ,θ ε has to be close to θ * . Similarly, the arguments above can be extended beyond l ∞ -bounded attack. Let Π be the set of n × d matrices whose rows are all bounded by in l p norm. The adversarial training is to optimize:
and we can transform the optimization in (6) to
for some b such that 0 ≤ b ≤ ε θ * q , where
it is equivalent to a ridge regression.
In this section, we can see how adversarial training can be related to classic method in statistics. It is worth exploring in the future the underlying theory about regularization imposed by adversarial training. We end up this subsection by giving the following characterization of the trade-off curve:
can be transformed into
In the case p = ∞, if we further assume (3) and (4) with ζ ≥ 1, ifθ ξ is a minimizer of the sample version of optimization (1), we can obtain
Numerical Experiments
We study the trade-off curves varying the following neural network parameters: the number of layers (depth), the number of filters (width) and neural network architectures (simple convolutional, VGG [17] and ResNet-50 [7] ); and the following attack parameters: size of the attack and attacks norms (l 2 and l ∞ ). We use VGG-16 with 64 filters in the first layer as the default architecture. We use 0.3 as the default attack size for l 2 attacks and 0.015 for l ∞ attacks. We do all our experiments on CIFAR-10, which has 60000 images of 32 × 32 × 3 [10] , and we normalize the input images to [0, 1] in all experiments. We study two trade-off curves: one for test set loss and the other for test set accuracy. We set ξ to be [0.001, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 0.999]. As explained in section 2, we use 0.001 and 0.999 instead of 0 and 1 for end points. Figures 2 and 3 show all testing results. In Figure 2 , we fix the neural network architecture to be VGG-16 and change other parameters. Overall, we observe that there indeed exists an inherent tension between robustness and accuracy. Besides, we found that as we increase the capacity of networks (e.g. larger depth or width), we achieve higher accuracy in both adversarial examples and legitimate ones, but the adversarial accuracy we need to sacrifice for increasing native loss is also increasing. As we increase the attack size, the adversarial accuracy we need to sacrifice for native accuracy is increasing. In addition, we found that comparing with l 2 attacks, the trade-off under l ∞ is more severe between adversarial accuracy and native accuracy.
Figure 3(E) shows the results cross different types of networks and 3(F) shows the results for the simple convolutional architecture with different width under l ∞ attack. As we can see, the best adversarial accuracy using VGG-16 is almost the same as ResNet-50 even though the capacity is very different, which confirms the observation by Su et al. [19] that network type is a more important factor than size with respect to robustness. 
Conclusion
We identify a trade-off between accuracy and robustness and explore the underlying theory behind it. Specifically, we derive a theoretical tool to understand how optimal loss function changes when the input data are adversarially perturbed. Besides, we show how adversarial learning helps regularize the linear model. We also empirically visualize the trade-off and relate it to previous works.
Supplementary Material Proof of Theorem 1
In order to prove theorem 1, let us first state the Danskin theorem. Lemma 1 (Danskin). Let B be nonempty compact topological space and h : R d × B → R be such that h(·, δ) is differentiable for every δ ∈ B and ∇ θ h(θ, δ) is continuous on R d × B. Also, let δ * (θ) = {δ ∈ arg max δ∈B h(θ, δ)}. Then, the corresponding max-function
is locally Lipschitz continuous, directionally differentiable, and its directional derivatives satisfy
In particular, if for some θ ∈ R d the set δ * (θ) = {δ * θ } is a singleton, the max-function is differentiable at θ and
By this lemma, we can easily obtain the following lemma:
Lemma 2. For anyθ that minimize ξ(θ) and lying in the interior, we can obtain
Proof. Sinceθ minimizes ξ(θ) and lies in the interior of Θ , we can obtain ξ (θ, r) = 0 for any direction vector r.
If there is a δ ∈ δ * (θ), such that ∇ θ h(θ, δ) = 0, then we take r = ∇ θ h(θ, δ)/ ∇ θ h(θ, δ) , we have
which is contradictory to the fact ∇ θ h(θ, δ) = 0.
Now we are ready to give the formal proof. In order for simplicity, we here use l(θ, x, y) instead of l(θ, x, y; A). With lemma 2, we can obtain that
With Taylor expansion and under the assumption of theorem 2, we can obtain
Here the assumption of compactness and continuity can help us to write the remainder
2 ) since we can bound every entry of Hθ. We use the same property again and again and we will not reiterate it. Now, let us perform taylor expansion on ∇ θ l(θ ε , x i , y i ) and ∇ x,θ l(θ ε , x i , y i ).
Thus, by simple algebra manipulation
We know if we divided ε on both sides, we know when ε goes to 0, the limit of the right handside exists if we assume the limit of lim ε→0 δ i /ε exist. Thus, θ ε −θ /ε cannot goes to infinity as ε goes to 0. In orther words, IFA must exist! Notice that δ i here actually should be δ ε,i , which will converge to the δ i ∈ S maximizing ∇ x l(θ, x i , y i ) · δ i .
By Hölder inequality,
where b k = | ∂ ∂x ·,k l(θ, x i , y i )|. Thus, our whole arguments stand including the existence of limit.
Thus, as ε → 0, we can obtain that 
Proof of Theroem 2
The proof of theorem 3 is almost the same, using Hölder inequality. Let us focus on calculating max P ∈Ξ 1 n Y − (X + P )θ Since P θ = (
T . By choosing p ij = sgn(θ j )sgn(x T i θ − y i )ε, we can obtain the maximum of Ifθ ε is a minimizer of the above optimization. Since we know that plugging in θ * , we can obtain the loss being ε 2 θ * 2 1 , thus,θ ε satisfies 1 n
Actually, it is easy to seeθ ε is also the solution of the following oracle optimization problem:
Thus, we can obtain thatθ ε is the solution to the following optimization:
for some 0 ≤ b ≤ ε θ * 1 , which is equivalent to LASSO: min θ∈Θ 1 n n i=1 (y i − x T i θ) 2 + λ θ 1 for some λ.
Proof of Corollary 1
Since θ * is a feasible solution, we know θ ε 1 ≤ θ
